CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 August 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat (Indonesia)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 686th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference, and on my own behalf, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, His Excellency Mr. Amre Moussa, who will be our first speaker today. As most of you will recall, the Foreign Minister has already addressed the Conference on a previous occasion, and his presence among us today is a further testimony to the continued importance attached by Egypt to this multilateral forum. I am sure that the Minister's statement will be followed by all of us with great interest and will give further impetus to our efforts.

I also have pleasure in welcoming yet again this year the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, who will also be addressing the Conference. I am sure that his visit to us at this crucial time in our negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty will be a source of encouragement in our endeavours.

Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your kind words. It gives me great pleasure to once again address the Conference on Disarmament, especially at this important juncture in its work. I am particularly pleased to do so while you, the Permanent Representative of a friendly and sisterly country, Indonesia, are presiding over the Conference. Your country is also the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement to whose principles Egypt adheres and of which Egypt is a very loyal member.

On this occasion, I would also like to express my pleasure for the appointment of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky as Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament. I have known Mr. Petrovsky for a long time. His vast knowledge and commitment to promoting disarmament and prospects for peace can only bode well for the future of your work here.

The world today is in a state of flux which, on the one hand, would provide us with an opportunity to reshape our relations, and redirect our efforts towards the establishment of a community of nations based on equality, peace and security for all, but on the other hand, that state of flux embodies many risks and brings with it deep-rooted anxieties. It has challenged and tested many of the fundamental pillars upon which international relations have been based, by flaunting the rule of law and the respect for humanity, as we see in Bosnia and elsewhere. This state of affairs, if not resolutely responded to, threatens to tear the very fabric of the community of nations and its societies, as well as discredit and devalue even the most lofty and eloquent commitments to what we are talking about, a new world order.

In our attempts to take advantage of the opportunities that lie before us, and in our struggle to ensure that the appalling events of recent years do not drag us down with them, security for our peoples and nations will always remain at the forefront of our concerns. Since disarmament is a major component of security, your work here in the months to come will, we do believe, have a lasting effect on the future of international relations.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

In determining its positions on security and disarmament issues, Egypt, like every other State in the community of nations, takes as its primordial concern their implications for its national interests in general, and for the safety of its people and sanctity of its territory. The first question that comes to mind is the implication of any suggested measure for our national security within our direct regional context, i.e. the Middle East, Africa and the Mediterranean.

Egypt is committed to the achievement of security at the lowest level of armaments. In this context, in order for us to take a positive position vis-à-vis any disarmament measure, three fundamental criteria have to be satisfied from a regional perspective.

Firstly, disarmament measures have to result in an enhanced security balance in our region. The military dimension of security in any region involves a complex and complicated mix of checks and balances. Consequently, while we do not advocate an arbitrary linkage of all disarmament measures, it is impossible to decouple any measure from the overall military matrix which determines security. In other words, any measure will be judged not only on its own merit, but also in light of overall parallel measures that would be necessary to enhance regional security.

Secondly, disarmament measures have to effectively lead to lower levels of armament. The world in general and our region in particular suffers gravely from over-armament. For disarmament measures to enhance security they should not, and cannot, be stop-gap measures, simply consolidating the status quo under the guise of pragmatism or realism or any other pretext. We must look critically at all the components of threat attributable to a weapons system, i.e. destructive capacity, quantity, effectiveness, imports, domestic capabilities, stockpiles, etc. Where limited measures are necessary, they must, within a clearly defined time-frame, be locked in with an unambiguous commitment to move towards the ultimate objective of prohibiting the weapons system and achieving reductions to levels that are not perceived to be threatening by their neighbours. This, in addition to the element of general transparency, especially in the domain of weapons of mass destruction.

Thirdly, disarmament measures in a regional context must be all-encompassing. In attempting to achieve security we are embarking on an objective which by nature is long-term and which progressively - under ideal circumstances - should lead to indefinite prohibitions or reductions. Therefore, for these measures to be sustainable we must strive for equal legal obligations for all States within a region. Anything less cannot withstand the test of time. This is especially valid with respect to States in one region which have acquired the weapons system or have the capability to do so.

In spite of the many difficulties that remain, our regional circumstances today are much more conducive to the adoption of concrete and far-reaching disarmament measures than they were just a few months ago.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

Political developments in South Africa, and progress towards the development of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in our continent, are major contributions towards the enhancement of security in Africa, in spite of the human tragedy which we have seen in Somalia and Rwanda.

We have seen the birth of a constructive dialogue within a forum of Mediterranean countries, north and south, that met recently in Alexandria, Egypt. While disarmament is not yet a subject of consideration in this forum, the cooperative engagement which was evident towards dealing with the issues of the Mediterranean will no doubt have positive implications on the overall security perceptions of Mediterranean States.

In the Middle East, the doors of peace which Egypt nudged ajar years ago are now wide open, and the winds of hope and prosperity pass freely. The peoples of this region are determined to resolve their historic conflicts, and to chart a new Middle East which would by necessity include a regime for arms control and regional security. We are hopeful that the recent developments between Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and progress on both the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, will give impetus to the early conclusion of such a regime, with the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical and biological. This regime must also entail the application of full-scope safeguards to nuclear facilities and the adherence of all the States of the region, including Israel, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and here I wish to reiterate that a truly new matrix of relations in the Middle East will not materialize without such a regime that is equitable and fair in so far as disarmament and weapons control is concerned. Any policy that would reflect inconsistencies, favouritism or double standards will not work. It will sow havoc again in the Middle East.

A number of nuclear issues are before this session of the CD. The Final Declaration of the eleventh Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement held recently in Cairo addressed many of these issues given the approach of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Egypt fully supports the positions outlined in the Final Declaration. At the same time, in light of the importance of these issues I would like to share with you a few additional reflections in this regard.

First, after long years of deadlock, the Conference on Disarmament has finally engaged in a negotiating process which should result in a comprehensive test-ban treaty, thus halting definitively all nuclear tests, in all environments, for all times. We are hopeful that such a treaty will indeed prevent horizontal proliferation and the emergence of any new nuclear-weapon States, and cap any further vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The completion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should not, however, be a reason for complacency. Experience has shown that testing is not the only indispensable road that leads to a nuclear capability. It is therefore a must that a CTBT be rapidly and effectively complemented by other long-overdue nuclear disarmament measures.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

Second, as long as vast arsenals of nuclear arms are scattered in many parts of the world, the question of negative security assurances will continue to be one of major importance to non-nuclear-weapon States, and particularly those who have definitively renounced the nuclear option. It is truly regrettable that States which have legally forsaken the nuclear option have not received such guarantees, in a legally binding instrument. The signs are far from encouraging because some continue to insist that unilateral or plurilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States which are not legally binding would be enough to provide such assurances. I can only hope that, in the little time remaining during the third part of the CD's 1994 session, a breakthrough will occur on negative security assurances.

Third, we are happy to note that it is generally agreed that the Conference on Disarmament is an appropriate forum to deal with the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Egypt fully favours the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the CD with a mandate to negotiate a multilateral treaty banning any further production of any weapons usable fissile material. However, such a treaty, in order to be effectively verifiable, must lead the way towards dealing appropriately with existing stockpiles of those materials, through the progressive transfer of these stockpiles to international control prior to rendering them unusable.

Fourth, I note with regret that, despite repeated calls by a large number of States, including Egypt, there continues to be a strong resistance, if not outright opposition, by some countries, which reject the idea of applying effective measures of transparency to weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, the accumulation of which is both excessive and destabilizing. When I last addressed the Conference on Disarmament, in January 1993, I asked why it was that weapons of mass destruction and their relevant technology were not covered by transparency measures. I have yet to receive a convincing answer to that question. Excluding weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, from the transparency drive and from the United Nations Register will result in a significantly weakened Register, a decidedly weakened Register, and will severely undermine its vocation as a confidence-building and early-warning mechanism aimed at averting potential aggression or threats to international peace and security.

The months remaining prior to convening the 1995 NPT Review Conference provide us with a unique opportunity to achieve significant progress in nuclear disarmament and arms control. Certain measures are truly necessary. Measures ensuring the universality of the NPT, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, adequate negative security assurances, serious ongoing work on an effective cut-off treaty, and a renewed credible commitment for nuclear disarmament would augur well for a successful NPT Review Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. HOLUM (United States of America): I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament again during its session this year. First, Mr. President, may I congratulate you on the skilful way in which you have conducted the business of the CD during your presidency; I know that the United States delegation has provided you with its fullest cooperation. I would also like to extend once again my greetings to Mr. Petrovsky, the CD Secretary-General, and to his deputy, Mr. Bensmail. We appreciate the efforts you are making on behalf of all of us in facilitating our negotiations. Also, we are very pleased that Foreign Minister Moussa could be with us today and have listened with great care to his thoughtful speech.

The Conference on Disarmament has accomplished a great deal in recent years, and much since its opening in January. In one sense, our progress in the CD is more than any of us had a right to expect - a testament to the abilities of this body. But in another sense our recent efforts are not enough. The United States is more committed than ever to concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible time. None of us can rest - none can be satisfied by our noteworthy progress to date - until the world's nations have agreed once and for all to stop testing nuclear weapons. So I am here neither to criticize the CD nor praise it unconditionally, but rather to exhort it.

Last January I was privileged to report to you President Clinton's commitment to achievement of a comprehensive test ban "at the earliest possible time". Six months later, he has asked me to return here to tell you that those instructions to our delegation remain fully in effect and that "earliest possible time" means just what it says. It most assuredly is not diplomatic code for "a relaxed pace". It does not mean take all the time allowed by United States law. It means take only the time necessary, negotiating diligently and in good faith, to write a sound treaty.

President Clinton's commitment to the test ban is authenticated by another decision, our continued moratorium on nuclear testing. Despite China's tests, President Clinton has extended our moratorium for a third year, through September of 1995.

I ask you to consider carefully what that means. The President's decision to extend the testing moratorium balanced the potential value of additional tests against restraint by others, against the impact on our non-proliferation goals, and against progress in the test-ban negotiations here. In practical effect, this means that, where the United States is concerned, the central and profound policy decision that many seek has already been made. If things here and elsewhere go as we hope, the testing moratorium the United States adopted in 1992 will last forever. This practical reality is underscored by the President's definitive declaration to the United Nations General Assembly last September, when he said, "In the face of disturbing signs, I renew my call on the nuclear States to abide by that moratorium as we

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negotiate to stop nuclear testing for all time". Simply put, we are prepared for the conclusion that the United States has already conducted its last nuclear test, that we will never test again.

As we contemplate that reality, these negotiations - and other developments, including preparations for the NPT Conference next year - should be given even greater energy and purpose. The United States seeks a CTBT that will bring an end to all nuclear explosions, period. No thresholds. No exceptions. And by that I mean not just all explosions, but all States. Success demands in particular the full support and participation of all five nuclear-weapon States. And we seek universal adherence.

Of course, the United States and the other nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility in this negotiation, and of course we also have special experience and knowledge that can aid it considerably. So we will continue to work closely with the other nuclear-weapon States to propel this effort toward fruition.

I wish to commend Ambassador Marín Bosch, Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, as he accelerates the Committee's work. The United States supports his efforts to develop a complete text from contributions developed in the working groups on verification and on legal and institutional issues under the leadership, respectively, of Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski. Nevertheless, much time has passed and much work remains to be done. We need a document that will both focus and energize our work. And we look to the Committee Chairman for his leadership to bring this about.

Now, when I last spoke to you, I said the United States would be out front pulling in these negotiations, rather than in the back dragging its heels. We plan to persist in, and indeed, to intensify, our efforts to fulfil the President's instructions. So I urge the Conference to make use of all the time possibly available to it, even outside the normal term of the CD, to move these negotiations forward. The United States delegation is prepared to work continuously in the NTB Committee and its working groups in the period after 7 September and prior to the opening of the 1995 session so as to make all possible progress this year and prior to the start of the NPT Extension Conference in April 1995.

A kind of linkage has grown in the minds of some between the NPT Extension Conference and progress in other areas. All parts of the international arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament architecture are, of course, interrelated. But it is a disservice to major regimes or initiatives to posit any kind of rigid "quid-pro-quo" relationship between them. The NPT should be extended because of its own intense merits to world peace. A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is an opportunity whose time has arrived. We should seize it not because it goes well with NPT, but because it deserves to be done.

Another major initiative being undertaken here deserves the CD's independent attention: the fissile material cut-off. Such a global convention would prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear

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explosives or outside international safeguards. It could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of non-NPT States under some measure of restraint for the first time. And it would likewise halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons in the five declared nuclear-weapon States.

President Clinton committed the United States to negotiation of such a cut-off when he appeared before the United Nations General Assembly last September. The General Assembly subsequently passed, by consensus, a resolution recommending negotiation of such a ban, "in the most appropriate international forum". In January of this year, the CD responded by appointing Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon as Special Coordinator to consult with CD States on the ways and means to negotiate a cut-off convention. He has ably pursued this task and established that a consensus exists in the CD to negotiate the treaty in this forum. I urge the CD to adopt a simple negotiating mandate based on the consensus agreement recorded in the General Assembly's resolution. Such a mandate would establish an ad hoc committee and direct it to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

The CD needs to move forward decisively in this matter - not only to reduce the threat posed by the continued production of fissile material, but to silence the voices that whisper it cannot handle two major responsibilities at the same time. I know all this takes resources, attention, and commitment. We will continue to provide Ambassador Ledogar with everything he needs to help accomplish the ambitious goals I have come here to address.

Security assurances are another matter holding significant promise. For many years, the CD has conducted valuable work on negative assurances. The United States supports a "two-track" approach to NSA: discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee, and discussions among the nuclear-weapon States. We will continue to work vigorously in both forums, and I congratulate Ambassador Guillaume for his leadership this year in the former.

And while we are hard at work with the other nuclear-weapon States, the United States presidential commitment stands. Our unilateral commitment stresses that assurances will be provided to non-nuclear States that are parties to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco unless the United States is attacked by that non-nuclear-weapon State in alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

I would not want to speak at the Conference on Disarmament without addressing an issue which is on the minds of many - expansion of CD membership. The United States continues to favour strongly expansion of the Conference. We regret that it has not been possible to achieve such expansion due to the impediment which we have identified, namely, the inappropriate inclusion of any State under comprehensive Security Council sanctions, according to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The

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United States remains willing to consider any reasonable initiative designed to resolve this situation, and we believe the CD is the proper forum to find an appropriate solution.

President John Kennedy was fond of saying that from those to whom much has been given, much is expected. The CD's remarkable success with the CWC and its notable progress on the CTBT prove it is a body of great ability. And so the world expects much of it, of you.

One of the encouraging trends of these times has been the ability of the international community to clear away much of the divisive ideological and political underbrush that occupied so much time, to so little effect, during the era of maximum East-West and North-South confrontation. Of course, those habits have not entirely disappeared. My appeal to you is that, to the extent that such inclinations persist, this is the last place they should be exercised. For the CD is not a place for scoring political points, but for doing serious work and producing tangible results. Indeed, in a world where even bilateral arms control has become multilateral, this institution, the able statesmen and experts who labour here, and the extraordinary and intricate methods of diplomacy you have mastered here, have become the wave of the future and the embodiment of our hopes for a safer world.

With the end of the cold war, nuclear proliferation pressures may be more substantial than ever. Such pressures, as you know, can be vertical as well as horizontal. So this is at once the best time to buttress international security and the most essential time. Now especially, with the largest nuclear-weapon Powers finally able to de-emphasize nuclear weapons in their defence planning, this is no time to revert to old habits.

We have now had five decades of nuclear testing and are in the fifth decade of calls to stop it. By any fair description, the world's pursuit of a CTBT has been a long-distance race. Such races are not won by limping across the finish line, or even by being satisfied with moderate progress. They are won with concluding surges of energy and commitment. We are in the final stages of our race. The finish line is within our view. We must pick up the pace. We must agree to cease nuclear explosive testing without exceptions, without artificial linkages, without delay - to conclude a CTBT before the chance of our lifetimes has passed.

It is an intriguing historical coincidence that the fifteenth anniversary of the first nuclear explosion and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT fall in the same year, 1995. I hope our efforts can make this coincidence into an important signpost of progress.

From the very first atomic blast at Alamagordo, mankind has been struggling to free itself from the ferocious beast unleashed there. Since then, thousands of women and men of good will and intellect have pursued - passionately, painstakingly - the compelling mission of our age. Working together, let us rededicate ourselves to that mission: to shepherd this beast back into its cage, to bring what was unleashed in a blinding blast of heat in

(Mr. Holum, United States)

the New Mexico desert to a fitting end in the cool atmosphere of reason in Geneva, to ensure that our first half-century of nuclear explosions is our last.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Holum for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, accept the warm congratulations of my delegation for the manner in which you have been conducting the work of this Conference. Indonesia and Mexico have worked closely in many fields, including that of nuclear disarmament, a subject we shall address today. But first, permit me to extend a cordial welcome to our colleague from the Netherlands and to wish all the best to Ambassadors Wagenmakers and Benhima. The presence of Foreign Minister Amre Moussa is testimony to the importance his Government attaches to this forum in particular and to disarmament in general. We also listened with interest to the remarks by Mr. John Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, particularly, very particularly to his appeal to proceed towards the achievement of a CTBT.

The fact that Mexico is taking the floor immediately after the United States and just before Canada does not mean a concerted effort in this forum by the countries belonging to the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA.

On the eve of the forty-ninth anniversary of the atomic bombs that fell on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the delegation of Mexico would like to make a brief statement on the problem facing the international community with regard to nuclear proliferation.

Our long struggle for nuclear disarmament, which includes the chapter on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whose full implementation is happily about to be attained, is known to all. We consider the chairmanship of the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee as a recognition of our efforts in this field. So far this year the Committee has made important progress but we feel we could and should work more quickly, especially with a view to the drawing up of a rolling text, which would undoubtedly facilitate the negotiation of a CTBT. That, in turn, would contribute to the success of the 1995 Conference on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The task of the 1995 NPT Conference is twofold: to carry out the fifth five-year review of the Treaty's operation and to decide on the Treaty's extension. When the NPT was negotiated in the mid-1960s, no one could foresee the evolution of the international situation, let alone the dramatic changes of recent years. But the negotiators did have a clear idea of the need to review periodically the operation of the Treaty and, in the light of those reviews, to determine whether or not to extend it indefinitely. Thus the provisions of articles VIII (para. 3) and X (para. 2).

Whereas many countries have already stated that the NPT should be extended indefinitely, others have yet to make a final decision. It seems

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

premature to have decided to extend the NPT years before the 1995 Conference and the examination in depth of its operation. That Conference and its ongoing preparatory process offer the international community a good opportunity to consider in detail the Treaty's operation and to chart a strategy that will ensure not only the continuity of the NPT but full compliance with its provisions as well.

The situation today regarding the proliferation - vertical as well as horizontal - of nuclear weapons is very different from that of the 1960s. First, there are many more thousands of nuclear weapons now than there were 25 years ago. Second, there is much more weapons-grade nuclear material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium). Third, enormous advances have been made regarding nuclear technology in general. And fourth, the physical control of nuclear materials is far more difficult, and in some instances it seems to exceed the capabilities of the nation-State.

All of this has changed some of the NPT's basic assumptions. For example, one can no longer divide the world neatly between five nuclear-weapon States and all other countries. There are nations that perhaps already have a small number of nuclear devices. Then there is South Africa, the first ex-nuclear-weapon State. A third category includes the de facto nuclear-weapon States, i.e., those States that "inherited" nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). And finally, some non-nuclear-weapon States could be described as "near"-nuclear-weapon States, either because they already have the necessary components and technology or because they could easily acquire them. The foregoing constitutes a set of questions that must, we feel, be addressed.

Another set of problems derives from the fact that some of the NPT's provisions are now perceived as obsolete or much less relevant. For example, peaceful nuclear explosions were once considered to hold the key to many engineering and other civilian projects; but today, because of concern about their effects and the impossibility of distinguishing between a peaceful and a military nuclear device, environmental and non-proliferation considerations have become paramount.

But the fundamental question that all the parties to the NPT will have to examine in 1995 is whether or not they have lived up to the bargain struck in 1970: non-nuclear-weapon States would forego the nuclear option and nuclear-weapon States move towards nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Some NPT parties have described doomsday scenarios if the Treaty is not extended indefinitely and unconditionally. Others fear that such an extension might postpone indefinitely the full implementation of article VI and thus render permanent the present temporary nuclear status of some States. The fact is that we are already facing a very delicate situation regarding nuclear proliferation.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

All NPT parties, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, must be convinced that the decision regarding its extension not only enhances their own security but also improves the non-proliferation regime in general. And that will not be an easy task. To facilitate it, the nuclear-weapon States should put forward the elements of a nuclear disarmament programme, including: (a) the reiteration of the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, (b) future bilateral steps between the Russian Federation and the United States with a view to reducing their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels contemplated in START I and II, and (c) the measures that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in the light of the above-mentioned reductions, that is, the point at which they too will become involved in a multilateral nuclear disarmament process.

This raises the need for greater transparency in the nuclear field. Discussions regarding article VI of the NPT must be thorough and based on hard facts, not wishful thinking. Are the existing nuclear arsenals still being improved or not? In other words, has the qualitative nuclear arms race finally ceased? And, if not, which nuclear-weapon States are still pursuing major improvements of their stockpiles and why? Unlike nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT are subject to periodic international scrutiny. The Treaty's five-year reviews should be used, among other things, to evaluate the activities of the nuclear-weapon States. And this will be all the more relevant as we approach the decision to extend the Treaty.

Moreover, it would be advisable for all parties to the NPT to agree sufficiently in advance of the 1995 Conference on a series of measures aimed at bolstering the present regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would ensure the success of the 1995 Conference. And it could be achieved through the conclusion of a series of multilateral agreements, including a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the prohibition of the production of fissile material and legally-binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, nor will they be threatened with their use.

Quite obviously, some will consider the foregoing as an ambitious nuclear disarmament programme. But it is also obvious that the present international climate is conducive to it and that the NPT's provisions require it.

For decades the nuclear arms race was seen as both a cause and an effect of East/West confrontation. Nuclear disarmament (as opposed to nuclear "arms control") was never seriously contemplated. The NPT, itself a product of the super-Powers' shared concern with horizontal proliferation, speaks of the need "to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery". East/West tensions have certainly "eased" and trust between States has been strengthened, and yet not all States are willing (or ready) to move

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towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This is due in part to the inertia of cold-war thinking and an attachment to nuclear postures which, although never widely accepted, are now certainly obsolete.

To conclude, we should like to insist that, when examining the contents of its agenda, the Conference on Disarmament consider also the problem of nuclear non-proliferation, as well as the broader question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in all its aspects. We made this suggestion a few years ago and we reiterate it now. The discussion of those subjects could serve us as a compass to chart a future course. It has been but a short while - with the intensification of the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (whose instrument of ratification my Government is about to deposit) and now with the CTBT negotiations - since the Conference on Disarmament forsook the indolent charm that characterized it for many years - I repeat, for many years. We are now in a situation to play to the full the role for which the Conference was created.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, who will speak in his capacity as Special Coordinator on "cut-off".

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, in taking the floor for the second time under your presidency, may I also congratulate you once again on your skilful management of the Conference. I am pleased to be in this forum in a trilogy of North American countries to speak. I would only suggest that, if we are to be regarded as forming a conspiracy, we will have to improve on our coordination in order to make it less obvious.

Since I last reported to the plenary on June 30, I have continued to work towards obtaining agreement on a negotiating mandate for an ad hoc committee on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. I continue to believe that the agreement reached at the United Nations General Assembly last fall, which was supported by all delegations, can and should be carried forward so that the international community does not lose the opportunity to launch negotiations on a cut-off treaty prior to the end of this session. It is important that we sustain the momentum begun with the General Assembly resolution last fall and continued with the consensus achieved here with the appointment of a Special Coordinator and with the consensus reached that the CD is the appropriate forum for the negotiation of such a treaty.

In my June 30 report I expressed the view that I would consider convening one or two technical sessions, and also open-ended sessions for a general discussion of the issues involved in a cut-off. I would still like to see this take place and would be pleased to encourage the Conference to approve such sessions but, in view of time constraints we face, I believe we should first concentrate our efforts on reaching agreement on a mandate. It would be more productive to hold these sessions once the ad hoc committee has been

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

established and appropriately mandated. Given the importance of this issue to Canada and the need to move expeditiously, my Government is currently undertaking démarches in many capitals with a view to obtaining support for a mandate modelled on the General Assembly resolution.

As of today, not much more than four weeks remain until the conclusion of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Thus the need to reach agreement on the formation of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate is pressing and urgent. A failure during the present session of the CD to reach agreement on a mandate will in all likelihood result in the return of "cut-off" to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly for further consideration and debate. Some delegations here seem to be of the view that this fall's General Assembly can improve on the consensus resolution reached last year by adding some additional elements to it; or they may at least believe that, having failed to secure an improved resolution, they can easily recreate the agreement reached at the Assembly's forty-eighth session. I do not share the optimism of those delegations. In my view, it is highly unlikely that consensus could be reached on a General Assembly resolution which differed in substance from the 1993 resolution. And in my view it is also questionable whether the consensus that produced last year's breakthrough resolution can easily be reproduced again. Bear in mind that these issues are more clearly defined now, after the consultations we have held here. The differences in our respective approaches to a cut-off treaty probably are reconcilable in detailed negotiation involving both experts and policy decision-makers. But they are not, in my view, easily reconciled in mandate language.

We must, therefore, avoid the temptation to negotiate the substantive issues before the negotiating committee is established. There will be time and opportunity to delve fully into all the substantive matters once the negotiation is launched in the appropriate ad hoc committee. The current session of the CD represents the last viable opportunity, in my view, to draft an appropriate negotiating mandate. The adoption of a negotiating mandate and creation of an ad hoc committee would not, in my view, preclude the discussion by delegations of the appropriate scope of the convention in that committee.

Some delegations have also expressed the concern that they would be unable to service a new negotiation in the current 1994 session of the CD because of the already fully loaded agenda. Although it would of course be for the ad hoc committee itself to decide on its pace of work, let me assure those delegations that from my perspective at least, assuming the creation of the committee, I would expect a programme of work that recognized this fact and did not commence with an active negotiation between now and the end of the 1994 session.

I would instead anticipate one or two planning meetings for such a committee, which could elect a chairman and decide on what, if any, technical work could or should be done during the inter-sessional period. This work could either be undertaken by the committee in the inter-sessional period or commissioned by it for others to carry out. It would also decide on what other necessary preparatory work should be undertaken so that

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

delegations would be best prepared to begin the negotiation in earnest in the 1995 session. It could, for example, provide for the creation of a group of experts (either national experts or experts drawn from appropriate organizations or a combination of both) to conduct preliminary technical work to be of assistance to all delegations at the start of 1995.

As I reported on June 30, the majority of groups and delegations with whom I have consulted are prepared to accept a negotiating mandate based on United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75L, of 16 December 1993. I would strongly encourage other delegations to join this majority, and so advise me either bilaterally or through their group in the shortest possible time. Let me reiterate the form I believe such a mandate could take:

> "1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a 'Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'.
>
> "2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
>
> "3. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1994 session."

These three points replicate the substantive section of the 1993 General Assembly resolution which is now acceptable to a majority of groups and the majority of those States with whom I have consulted. I would state again that the proposed mandate does not preclude delegations from discussing in the ad hoc committee the appropriate scope of the convention or any other matter relevant to it.

As for the next steps, once I have been advised informally that all groups are satisfied with the mandate along the lines just proposed (or any other on which groups might agree), I would then propose to convene an informal meeting to confirm consensus on the negotiating mandate, then submit it for approval to the plenary.

We have made substantial progress which I think is of fundamental importance in achieving our objectives on this vital issue. It is my earnest hope that in the next few days we will complete this work.

Mr. KELLER (Germany): Mr. President, would you kindly allow me to make a statement regarding Working Group 1 of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. We promised that we would be circulating the revised version of the draft head treaty within the plenary, but due to technical reasons we have had to postpone this and it will now be circulated this afternoon in the margins of the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances.

The PRESIDENT: I am sure that the distinguished delegates have taken note of this statement.

(The President)

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. This timetable has been prepared in extensive consultations with the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It is so decided.

That concludes our business for today. However, before adjourning, I wish to remind you that this meeting will be immediately followed by a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 11 August 1994, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.